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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1328 
_____________ 
 
BRIAN SKILES, 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF READING; THOMAS J. MCMAHON, Mayor City of Reading, In His 
Individual and Official Capacity;  
BRAD REINHART, Code Administrator, City of Reading, In His Individual and Official 
Capacity;  
WILLIAM FRYMORE, Code Enforcement Officer City of Reading, In His Official 
Capacity;  
MICHELLE MAYFIELD, Code Enforcement Department, City of Reading, In Her 
Official Capacity;  
JAMES V. SANOCKI, Health Inspector, City of Reading Codes Enforcement Division, 
Property Maintenance Unit, 
In His Individual and Official Capacity; FRED YOURKAVITCH, Plumbing Inspector, 
City of Reading Codes Enforcement Division, Building/Trades Unit, In His Individual 
and Official Capacity;  
STEVE DUNKLE, Building Inspector, City of Reading Codes Enforcement Division, 
Building/Trades Unit, In His Individual and Official Capacity; MICHELLE MAYFIELD, 
Legal Specialist City of Reading Department of Law, 
 In Her Individual and Official Capacity 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 10-cv-02270) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 22, 2011 
______________ 
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Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 27, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Brian Skiles (“Skiles”) appeals the District Court‟s January 7, 2011 Order 
dismissing, with prejudice, his Amended Complaint against the City of Reading (the 
“City”) and certain of its governmental officials (collectively, the “City Defendants”),1 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Amended Complaint alleged 
that the City Defendants violated his constitutional rights through the improper 
enforcement of the City‟s zoning, housing, and health regulations applicable to his 
residential and commercial properties.  Skiles contends that the District Court applied an 
improper heightened standard to determine the merits of his substantive due process 
claim and otherwise failed to consider his well-pled factual allegations.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the District Court‟s Order. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
                                              
1
 The City Defendants named in the Amended Complaint are: the City, City Mayor 
Thomas McMahon, City Code Administrator Brad Reinhart, City Code Enforcement 
Officer William Frymoyer, City Assistant Solicitor Michelle Mayfield, Esq., City Health 
Inspector James Sanocki, City Building Inspector Steve Dunkle, and City Plumbing 
Inspector Fred Yourkavitch.  According to the City Defendants, although named in the 
Amended Complaint, Mr. Yourkavitch died prior to the initiation of the lawsuit, and is no 
longer a party to this action, as service was never perfected on his estate. 
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 Skiles owns multiple residential rental properties throughout the City and one 
commercial property—the “Scarab” bar and restaurant that is known as “Daddy‟s Night 
Club”—located in the City at 724 Franklin Street.  Beginning in 2006, Mayor McMahon 
began implementation of a policy called “Downtown 20/20,” designed to “establish a 
unified vision for improving the quality of life in Greater Reading.”  (App. 11.)  The 
objective of the policy was to reduce the number of rental properties and boarding houses 
and to revitalize the City‟s commercial center. 
 Skiles alleged that the City Defendants sought to destroy the economic viability of 
his residential and commercial properties through their enforcement of various zoning, 
residential, and health regulations.  Skiles alludes to two instances proving that the policy 
was inimical to his interest.  First, Skiles points to an exchange in May 2008 in which the 
City Defendants “arbitrarily” changed the zoning approval for one of his residential 
properties, reducing the number of permissible parking spaces from sixteen to eight.
2
  
(App. 14.)  The second instance occurred a month later, when the City Defendants 
allegedly misrepresented to two potential buyers of Skiles‟s residential properties that the 
properties were zoned for single families when, in fact, they were zoned as multi-family 
dwellings.   
 In February 2009, the City Defendants “arbitrarily and unilaterally” sought to 
redesignate the zoning and housing classifications for several of Skiles‟s residential 
properties.  (App. 13.)  Skiles claimed that despite Assistant Solicitor Mayfield‟s promise 
in an April 2009 letter to correct the improper redesignations, the requisite corrections 
                                              
2
 The zoning permit was eventually corrected to allow for sixteen parking spaces. 
 4 
 
were never made.  Skiles does not allege, however, that he complied with the 
prerequisites to the issuance of new permits that Assistant Solicitor Mayfield identified in 
her letter.
3
  Moreover, Skiles acknowledged that he was not the sole target of the City 
Defendants‟ efforts to redesignate the zoning and housing classifications for rental 
properties, as other residential property owners were issued incorrect housing rental 
permits. 
 Skiles also alleged that the City Defendants sought to shut down his business, 
Daddy‟s Night Club.  He maintained that it was widely known that Daddy‟s Night Club 
entertained a homosexual clientele.  As such, the City Defendants sought to close 
Daddy‟s Night Club under the guise of regulatory violations based on the City 
Defendants‟ animus towards homosexuals.  Since 1982, Skiles has held the title to the 
property and has operated the business.  From 2006-2008, Jose Perez (“Perez”), a 
business associate of Skiles, was named on the commercial lease for Daddy‟s Night Club.  
Both the 2006 and 2007 health permits for the business were held in Perez‟s name.  In 
March 2007, the zoning permit for Daddy‟s Night Club was transferred to Perez.  Skiles 
never received an application in 2008 to renew the annual health permit for Daddy‟s 
Night Club, as he had in previous years.  On May 14, 2008, Skiles attempted to pay for 
and obtain the health permit at the City‟s Code Enforcement Office.  The office refused 
to issue the health permit and notified Skiles that Daddy‟s Night Club would be closed as 
                                              
3
 Although Skiles did not attach the April 2009 letter as an exhibit to his Amended 
Complaint, his reliance upon the letter allows us to consider it, as the City Defendants 
attached the letter as an exhibit to their motion to dismiss.  See Miller v. Clinton County, 
544 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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of that day.  Skiles maintained that neither he nor Perez had any prior notice that Daddy‟s 
Night Club was subject to closure due to violations of City regulations, though the 2007 
health permit for Daddy‟s Night Club expired on December 31, 2007.   
 Skiles alleged that the first notice he received came by letter two weeks after the 
City closed Daddy‟s Night Club, informing him that the business was closed for failure to 
obtain a health permit.  Skiles also was notified that he had to obtain a valid zoning 
permit for Daddy‟s Night Club.  In July 2008, Skiles transferred the zoning permit for 
Daddy‟s Night Club from Perez back to his name.  A month later, Skiles received a 
detailed letter outlining all of the regulatory violations identified at Daddy‟s Night Club 
and an edict that the violations had to be corrected before a health permit could issue.  
Skiles rectified the health violations and obtained a health permit for Daddy‟s Night 
Club, allowing him to reopen the business, in December 2009. 
 Skiles‟s federal lawsuit asserted three causes of action: (1) violation of his First 
Amendment right to freedom of association, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation 
of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) 
conspiracy to violate his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1983 and 1985.  The District Court granted the City Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss 
the Amended Complaint, holding that Skiles could not establish a constitutional 
violation.
4
 
                                              
4
 Skiles does not raise any arguments in his opening brief on appeal regarding the District 
Court‟s dismissal of his First Amendment freedom of association claim.  This claim is 
waived.  See Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (arguments not raised 
on appeal are waived).   
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Skiles‟s claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to review the 
District Court‟s final order.    
 We review a district court‟s order granting a motion to dismiss de novo.  Victaulic 
Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007).  A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
should be granted only if the plaintiff is unable to articulate “enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  A 
plaintiff is required, by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), to provide the “grounds 
of his entitle[ment] to relief [which] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; second alteration added).  Like the 
district court, “[w]e accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw 
all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff‟s] favor.”  Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of 
New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting McGovern v. City of 
Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 We review a district court‟s order dismissing a complaint with prejudice for an 
abuse of discretion.  United States ex rel. Willis v. United Health Grp., Inc., --- F.3d ----, 
2011 WL 2573380, at *4 (3d Cir. June 30, 2011). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 To state a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must first establish that, as a threshold matter, he has a 
protected constitutional interest at issue.
5
  See McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 825-26 
(3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that § 1983 protects only the deprivation of an individual‟s 
constitutional rights).  Assuming that this threshold is met, a plaintiff must prove that 
government employees engaged in conduct that “shocks the conscience.”  County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998); United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. 
Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2003).  This standard reflects the 
cornerstone of substantive due process that values “protection of the individual against 
arbitrary action of government.”  Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).  As a result, this conscience-shocking standard will be 
satisfied for “only the most egregious official conduct.”  Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 
385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Governmental conduct that is purposefully injurious is most likely to be indicative 
of conduct that “shocks the conscience.”  Evans v. Sec‟y Pa. Dep‟t of Corrs., 645 F.3d 
650, 660 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286 (recognizing that 
allegations of corruption and self-dealing would “shock the conscience”).  “The exact 
degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach the „conscience-shocking‟ level depends upon 
the circumstances of a particular case.”  Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 
                                              
5
 The parties do not dispute that Skiles has a constitutionally protected interest in his 
residential and commercial land. 
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(3d Cir. 1999).  In the zoning and land use context, the “shocks-the-conscience” standard 
is “designed to avoid converting federal courts into super zoning tribunals.”  Eichenlaub, 
385 F.3d at 285. 
 Skiles argues that the District Court improperly categorized this action as a land-
use dispute and then applied a heightened land-use version of the conscience-shocking 
standard.  We disagree.  The District Court correctly recognized that only governmental 
conduct that “shocks the conscience” will rise to the level of a substantive due process 
violation.  We have never recognized a heightened standard applicable to those 
substantive due process claims arising in the land-use context.  See id. (“The District 
Court properly held . . . that whether a zoning official‟s actions or inactions violate due 
process is determined by utilizing a „shocks the conscience‟ test.”).  Indeed, we have 
merely recognized that land-use decisions “are matters of local concern, and such 
disputes should not be transformed into substantive due process claims based only on 
allegations that government officials acted with „improper‟ motives.”  United Artists, 316 
F.3d at 402.  That land-use decisions are not matters for federal courts to address, absent 
conduct that “shocks the conscience,” in no way alters, and certainly does not heighten, 
this substantive due process standard. 
 But regardless of whether this lawsuit bears the hallmarks of a traditional land-use 
dispute, taking into account all of Skiles‟s well-pled allegations, we agree with the 
District Court that Skiles‟s substantive due process claim cannot survive a motion to 
dismiss.  Skiles alleged that the City Defendants improperly redesignated the zoning and 
housing classifications for his residential property.  As Skiles acknowledged, the City 
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Defendants corrected certain erroneous designations and, in any event, other residential 
property owners received similar treatment.  These allegations simply do not rise to the 
level of conduct that “shocks the conscience.”  Moreover, Mayor McMahon instituted a 
policy designed to revitalize the City‟s rental properties—a legitimate governmental 
interest—that belies Skiles‟s claim of unfair treatment.  See Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 
227 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2000).    
 Skiles‟s factual assertions are equally insufficient as a matter of law with respect 
to Daddy‟s Night Club.  Though Skiles claimed that the City Defendants targeted 
Daddy‟s Night Club based on personal animus towards its homosexual patrons, Skiles‟s 
only evidentiary support for this statement is that City Plumbing Inspector Yourkavitch 
allegedly referred to Skiles as a “fagot” [sic] during a 2006 inspection of Daddy‟s Night 
Club.  (App. 19.)  Even accepting the truth of this factual allegation, it falls woefully 
short of demonstrating that the City Defendants‟ treatment of Daddy‟s Night Club 
“shocks the conscience.”  Although the City Defendants closed Daddy‟s Night Club due 
to zoning and health code violations, Skiles was able to reopen his business once the 
violations were rectified.  If the City Defendants had been so intent on furthering their 
discriminatory goal by eradicating Daddy‟s Night Club, they would not have allowed the 
business to reopen once the regulatory violations were corrected.  
 Assuming the truth of Skiles‟s factual averments, Skiles is, at best, an aggrieved 
property owner, which is insufficient to sustain a substantive due process claim.
6
  As we 
                                              
6
 Following the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only 
demonstrate that the factual averments in the complaint state a plausible, rather than 
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have acknowledged, it is not the role of federal courts to provide a remedy for merely 
aggrieved land owners.  See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 285.  The conscience-shocking 
standard demands more.   
 Because we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal of Skiles‟s substantive due 
process claim, it follows a fortiori that Skiles cannot succeed on his claim alleging that 
the City Defendants conspired to violate his civil rights.  Accordingly, the District Court 
also did not err in dismissing the conspiracy count of Skiles‟s Amended Complaint.7 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s January 7, 2011 
Order.       
                                                                                                                                                  
probable, claim for relief.  Skiles‟s contention that the District Court failed to accept his 
well-pled factual allegations and instead applied an improper probability standard is not 
correct.  The District Court made clear that Skiles could not survive a motion to dismiss, 
even assuming the truth of his factual allegations.  Further, Skiles acknowledges that the 
District Court recognized that it must apply the plausibility standard.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 
24.) 
7
 Skiles argues that, at a minimum, the District Court erred in dismissing his suit without 
offering him an opportunity to further amend his Amended Complaint.  While it is true 
that a district court ordinarily should not dismiss a civil rights suit for failure to state a 
claim before affording the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint, such 
opportunity is not required where amendment would be futile.  Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. 
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).  Skiles already has 
amended the Complaint once, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that allowing 
him to further amend would be anything but futile. 
